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PROPER CAUSE FOR CONCERN:
NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL
ASSOCIATION V. BRUEN
ALI ROSENBLATT*

INTRODUCTION
Gun rights and gun control advocates alike are watching the
Supreme Court,1 to see what happens in New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association, Inc. v. Bruen.2 In this pivotal Second Amendment case, the
Court finds its first opportunity to substantially extend its 2008 decision
in District of Columbia v. Heller,3 and to define the scope of the Second
Amendment right to bear arms outside the home.4
The Court can decide this case narrowly by limiting its decision to
the statutes at issue, New York’s “proper cause” regime (the “New
York law”).5 Alternatively, the Court can rule broadly and use this case
to shift Second Amendment doctrine away from the predominant
“two-part inquiry” to the “text, history, and tradition” (“THT”)
approach, which has been relied upon in Second Amendment
jurisprudence when these three types of sources provide reasonably
Copyright @ 2022 Ali Rosenblatt
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2023, B.A. 2019, University of Michigan.
Thank you to the editorial staff of the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy who
provided thoughtful feedback. Special thanks to my parents, Fran and Robert Rosenblatt, for
their support and encouragement.
1. See U.S. Supreme Court Grants Cert in NYSRPA’s Second Amendment Concealed Carry
Case, N.Y. ST. RIFLE & PISTOL ASS’N (Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.nysrpa.org/u-s-supreme-courtgrants-cert-in-nysrpas-second-amendment-concealed-carry-case/ (describing the possible impact
of the case on gun rights advocates). See generally Brief for Everytown for Gun Safety as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents, N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (filed
Sept. 21, 2021) (advocating as gun control activists in favor of upholding the law).
2. N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Beach, 818 F.App’x 99 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. granted
sub nom, 141 S.Ct. 2566 (mem) (2021). The case originally named George P. Beach II, followed
by Keith M. Corlett, and eventually Richard Bruen—adjusting with the changing superintendents
of the New York State Police.
3. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
4. See generally id. (finding the Amendment grants individuals the right to keep and bear
arms in the home for self-defense, but not deciding the scope of the right outside the home).
5. See discussion infra Part I.
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clear guidance.6 Second Amendment advocates hope the Court will use
the “text, history, and tradition” approach to affirm that arms kept and
born outside the home (“public carry”) are constitutionally protected.7
Since Heller, there has been some debate about which interpretive
approach to apply when analyzing Second Amendment cases. The
Heller Court concluded that the Amendment granted individuals the
right to keep and bear arms, and found self-defense in the home to be
a hallmark of Second Amendment protections.8 Yet, in coming to this
conclusion, the Court failed to provide guidance on what type of
analytical test lower courts should employ when faced with Second
Amendment challenges to gun regulations.9 Most lower courts have
since established a two-part inquiry,10 while others have endorsed an
alternative approach that focuses on “text, history, and tradition.”11
Given its current composition, the Court will likely strike down the
New York law.12 Additionally, with Justice Kavanaugh, a key advocate
of the THT approach now on the Court,13 it appears the Court may also
adopt this interpretive framework. Nevertheless, both of these
outcomes would be inappropriate because neither would be consistent
with Heller.
I. FACTS
New York generally prohibits possession of firearms without a
license,14 and bans open carry of handguns completely.15 Yet, with a
license, individuals may possess handguns in public if they are
concealed (“concealed carry”).16 To obtain this license, applicants must

6. See discussion infra Part III.B.
7. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, No.
20-843 (filed Dec. 17, 2020) (“Text, history, and tradition readily confirm that the Second
Amendment protects a right to carry a firearm outside the home for self-defense.”).
8. Heller, 544 U.S. at 628.
9. See infra note 78 an accompanying text.
10. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
11. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
12. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
13. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.
dissenting) (endorsing the “text, history, and tradition” approach).
14. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01-04 (McKinney 2021) (criminalizing possession of a weapon
to varying degrees depending on the circumstances). Note that references to New York in text
refer to the state, rather than the city. New York City’s specific firearms laws are beyond the
purview of this commentary.
15. Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney)).
16. §§ 400.00(2)(c)–(f) (McKinney).
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meet certain requirements such as reaching a minimum age, possessing
no felony convictions, and being a United States citizen.17 A license to
concealed carry in public, however, will only be granted “when proper
cause exists for the issuance thereof.”18
The New York State Assembly did not clearly define “proper
cause.” In the absence of legislative guidance, New York courts have
interpreted proper cause to mean that one has “a special need for selfprotection distinguishable from that of the general community or of
persons engaged in the same profession.”19 This heightened
requirement denotes more than a general desire to concealed carry for
protection of self and property.20 Furthermore, living or working in a
“high crime area” by itself does not establish “proper cause” either.21
Rather, as Petitioners underscore in their Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
the standard requires “a particularized ‘finding’ of need” to obtain a
license.22
Given these requirements, New York joins eight other jurisdictions
as “may issue” jurisdictions,23 and seven states which require applicants
to show cause in order to receive a license.24 New York grants licensing
officials discretion to decide which applicants qualify for a license.25 By
contrast, twenty-one states with “shall issue” regimes provide limited
or no discretion to officials if an applicant meets basic qualifications.26
In 2014, New York resident Robert Nash tested the New York law

17. §§ 400.00(1)(a), (c), (f), (h) (McKinney).
18. § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney).
19. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 86 (quoting Klenosky v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 428 N.Y.S.2d
256, 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 87 (citations omitted).
22. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 8.
23. California, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York are “may issue” jurisdictions. Concealed Carry,
L.
CTR.,
https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-inGIFFORDS
public/concealed-carry/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2021), [hereinafter Concealed Carry Laws].
24. California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Rhode Island
also require applicants to show cause to receive a gun license. Eric Ruben, Supreme Court About
to Hear Major Case on Gun Restrictions, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 21, 2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/supreme-court-about-hear-majorcase-gun-restrictions. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 26150(a)(2) (West 2016) (“[T]he sheriff of a
county may issue a license to that person upon proof [that] . . . [g]ood cause exists for issuance of
the license.”); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(6)(ii) (West 2013) (requiring “a finding
that [a] permit is necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger”).
25. § 400.00(1) (McKinney).
26. Ten states are limited discretion “shall issue” jurisdictions, while eleven are nodiscretion “shall issue” ones. Concealed Carry Laws, supra note 23.
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when he applied for a public carry license in Rensselaer County.27
Though the licensing officer, Richard J. McNally, Jr., granted Nash a
license six months later, it was marked just for hunting.28 Nash was not
permitted to carry a handgun beyond the confines of his home for selfdefense purposes.29 On appeal to McNally, Nash requested a license
that permitted public carry for self-defense.30 Nash supported his
request with evidence of recent robberies in his neighborhood and his
completion of a firearm safety training course.31 In 2016, McNally
denied this request because Nash failed to adequately show “proper
cause.”32
A year later, Brandon Koch, another New York resident, also tested
the proper cause regime. Koch already held a license to publicly carry
a handgun for hunting and target practice purposes.33 Though this
license allowed him to carry his firearm to and from work, Koch was
unable to publicly carry for self-defense. Koch appealed to McNally in
2017 to remove the restrictions.34 On appeal, Koch cited his experience
with safely handling and operating firearms, as well as his completion
of safety training.35 McNally denied Koch’s appeal in 2018 for failure to
show proper cause.36
The New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. (“NYSRPA”)
is “a group organized to defend the right of New York residents to keep
and bear arms.”37 Both Nash and Koch are members of NYSRPA.38
Before Bruen, the group had filed other lawsuits that challenged New
York gun laws and regulations.39 One lawsuit that challenged New York
City restrictions on the transport of firearms outside the home was
actually granted certiorari by the Supreme Court; but the Court

27. N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Beach, 354 F.Supp.3d 143, 146 (N.D.N.Y. 2018),
aff’d, N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Beach, 818 F.App’x 99 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub
nom, 141 S.Ct. 2566 (mem) (2021).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 146–47.
35. Id. at 147.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 146.
39. See N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015) (challenging
a New York state law prohibiting possession of certain semiautomatic “assault weapons.”), cert.
denied, 579 U.S. 917 (mem) (2016).
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disposed of the case as moot because the restrictions were altered
before the Court could reach a decision.40
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The individual Petitioners, Koch and Nash, brought suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in the Northern District of New York after they had been
denied licenses.41 NYSRPA joined Koch and Nash as co-plaintiffs.42
Together, they sued George P. Beach II in his official capacity as
superintendent of the New York State Police.43 Petitioners also named
McNally in his official capacity as both a Justice of the New York
Supreme Court, Third Judicial District, and as the licensing officer for
Rensselaer County,44 where the Petitioners’ applications were
rejected.45
Petitioners alleged that Respondents violated the Second
Amendment “when they refused to grant them licenses to carry a
firearm outside the home for self-defense.”46 Respondents filed a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the
Petitioners’ claims contradict the Second Circuit’s holding in Kachalsky
v. County of Westchester.47 The District Court granted the motion to
dismiss, finding the facts of Kachalsky “substantially identical to the
facts presently before the [c]ourt.”48 Petitioners submitted a timely
appeal of this dismissal to the Second Circuit, which issued a short
opinion affirming the decision because Petitioners’ argument “fails
under . . . precedents.”49

40. N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S.Ct. 1525 (2020).
41. Beach, 354 F.Supp.3d at 145.
42. Id. at 146.
43. Id. at 143.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 147. Rensselaer County lies north of New York City and adjacent to the capitol,
Albany. Its biggest city is Troy. The total county population is around 160,000 as of 2018, and the
total area is 665 square miles. N.Y. ST., Rensselaer, https://www.ny.gov/counties/rensselaer (last
visited Dec. 21, 2021). By contrast, New York County which holds Manhattan has a population
of about 1.7 million as of 2018 and is 33 square miles. N.Y. ST., New York,
https://www.ny.gov/counties/new-york (last visited Dec. 21, 2021). During oral arguments, the
justices paid particular attention to the needs of New York City. See infra notes 185–86 and
accompanying text.
46. Beach, 354 F.Supp.3d at 145.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 148.
49. N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Beach, 818 F.App’x 99, 100 (2d Cir. 2020) (“As this
[c]ourt has recently affirmed, New York’s proper cause requirement does not violate the Second
Amendment.”), cert. granted sub nom, 141 S.Ct. 2566 (mem) (2021).
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The right to keep and bear arms is enshrined in the Second
Amendment of the United States Constitution: “A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”50 Uncertainties
regarding the scope of the right persist, and include which individuals
the right applies to, where it applies, and which firearms it covers.51
Most of the Second Amendment’s modern legal framework stems
from the Supreme Court’s District of Columbia v. Heller decision in
2008.52 Understanding Heller is essential to understanding the
arguments in Bruen. This Part explains the Heller decision and the
interpretive approaches taken by lower courts in the post-Heller
landscape. As seen in the following Part IV, Petitioners’ and
Respondents’ arguments are heavily informed by this precedent.
In Heller, the Court endorsed an “individuals rights” framework,
meaning that it found the Amendment protects an individual’s right to
keep and bear arms, particularly for self-defense in the home.53 Beyond
this holding, the Court did not offer clear instructions for lower courts
on how to decide future cases.54 The majority opinion made clear,
however, what interpretative methods it did not endorse, condemning
a “freestanding interest-balancing approach” like that proposed by
Justice Breyer in dissent.55 In light of Heller, most lower courts have
adopted a two-step inquiry that determines: 1) whether the law at issue
impacts a right within the Second Amendment’s scope; and 2) what
level of scrutiny is applicable.56 Circuits that have adopted this
approach have split on how “proper cause” (also known as “good
cause”) regimes fair under the Second Amendment.57 A minority of
judges have advocated for an alternative approach altogether, centered
on the “text, history, and tradition” of the Amendment.58
50. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
51. See, e.g., Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2015) (analyzing a
prohibition on firearms in a U.S. Postal Service parking lot); Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th
Cir. 2019) (examining a felon-in-possession law for nonviolent offenders).
52. 544 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
53. See id. at 628 (“[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second
Amendment right.”).
54. See id. at 628−29 (finding that the handgun ban would fail under any standard of scrutiny
without endorsing a particular level of scrutiny to apply).
55. Id. at 635 (internal quotations omitted).
56. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
57. See discussion infra Part III.C.
58. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
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A. Heller & its Precedents
Before Heller, the Supreme Court supported a militia-based
interpretation of the Amendment. In the 1939 case United States v.
Miller, the Court noted that the Second Amendment was created
“[w]ith [the] obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render
possible the effectiveness of [the Militia],” and that “[i]t must be
interpreted and applied with that end in view.”59 Nearly seventy years
later, the Supreme Court altered course in Heller, declaring that the
Second Amendment also extends to individuals outside of militia
contexts.60 In so doing, the Court transformed Second Amendment
doctrine.61 The Court subsequently extended its ruling to apply to state
and local government gun regulations in McDonald v. City of
Chicago.62
Heller marked a shift in jurisprudence by not only endorsing the
individual-rights view, but by also identifying self-defense as a core
Second Amendment principle.63 To this end, the Heller Court noted the
need for self-defense was “most acute” in the home.64 But the opinion
recognized that, like most rights, the Second Amendment is not
absolute.65 For example, the Court noted that most, but not all,
nineteenth century courts that evaluated concealed carry prohibitions
held them lawful.66 In a footnote, the Court explained that although it
identified “presumptively lawful regulatory measures,” its list of such
lawful regulations was not exhaustive.67
Post-Heller and post-McDonald, it is clear that “Second
Amendment guarantees are at their zenith within the home.”68 But the

59. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
60. See Heller, 544 U.S. at 592 (discussing “the individual right to possess and carry weapons
in case of confrontation.”).
61. See JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND
AMENDMENT: RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 51 (2018) (“[T]he modern
Second Amendment was created on . . . the day the Supreme Court held in . . . Heller that the
right to keep and bear arms covers private purpose such as self-defense.”) (emphasis added).
62. 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (finding the right endorsed in Heller “fully applicable to the
States.”).
63. Heller, 544 U.S. at 628.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 626−27 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms.”).
66. Id. at 626.
67. Id. at 627, n.26.
68. Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Heller, 544 U.S.
at 628–29). See also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (extending Heller to
also apply to state and local government actions).
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Court did not clarify either the scope of the Second Amendment right
outside of the home or the standards for determining when and how
the government can regulate the right.69 More test cases are needed for
further clarification.70
B. Analyzing Post-Heller Second Amendment Caselaw
The Heller majority did not say what analytical test lower courts
should use when faced with Second Amendment challenges to gun
regulations.71 Most courts have since adopted a two-step inquiry,72
asking whether a regulation implicates the Second Amendment and, if
so, whether the regulation passes some level of means-end scrutiny.73
But utilizing this approach has led courts to divergent results.74 And
Justice Kavanaugh has in the past endorsed the alternative THT
framework as a judge on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.75 Now on
the Supreme Court, he may advocate for THT once again.76
1. Lingering Ambiguities
The Heller Court stated that an interest-balancing test would not
be appropriate for Second Amendment cases,77 but withheld clearer
guidance on the proper test to use by determining the law at issue
would be unconstitutional under any possible standard of scrutiny.78
There are three basic tiers of scrutiny for analyzing constitutional law
cases: Rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.79
69. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750 (2010).
70. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 88 (“[I]n many ways, [Heller] raises more questions than it
answers.”).
71. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
72. See Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1507 (2018) (noting “[a] steadily
increasing percentage of courts . . . have applied the two-part test or a levels-of-scrutiny analysis
familiar to other areas of constitutional law.”).
73. See e.g. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City
of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701–04 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir.
2012) (adopting the two-step inquiry).
74. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
75. Heller, 670 F.3d at 1271–73 (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting).
76. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
77. District of Columbia v. Heller, 544 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
78. Id. at 573.
79. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[R]ational basis
review requires the challenged law to bear a rational link to a legitimate public interest.
Intermediate scrutiny looks for a substantial link to an important interest. And strict scrutiny
demands that a law be narrowly tailored to a compelling public interest.”).

ROSENBLATT_2.21.22_FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

PROPER CAUSE FOR CONCERN

2/24/2022 12:38 PM

247

It has been left to the lower courts to determine the way forward in
analyzing Second Amendment challenges,80 and most of these courts
have coalesced around a two-step inquiry.81
2. Majority Approach: Two-Step Inquiry
When called upon to assess the constitutionality of various firearm
regulations, most lower courts first look at the Second Amendment’s
scope and then, if applicable, determine what tier of scrutiny applies.82
The first step in this test asks whether the “challenged law burdens
conduct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment right, as
historically understood.”83 To determine historical understanding,
judges must analyze whether the right at issue “was understood to be
within the scope of the [Second Amendment] at the time of
ratification.”84 When examining a state law, courts have indicated the
“pertinent point in time” for analysis is 1868, the year of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification.85 If the contested law implicates conduct
outside the Second Amendment’s scope, the law is constitutional and
the inquiry ends.86
Courts advance to step two when historical evidence “is
inconclusive or suggests that the regulated activity is not categorically
unprotected.”87 For this step, courts determine the appropriate level of
scrutiny to apply.88 If the law at issue regulates conduct at the “core” of
80. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 72, at 1433 (providing an empirical analysis of postHeller Second Amendment doctrine in the federal appellate and state courts); Post-Heller
Litigation Summary, GIFFORDS L. CTR. (Aug. 25, 2020), https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gunlaws/litigation/post-heller-litigation-summary/ (detailing the different Second Amendment issues
that have arisen in over 1,400 lower court cases).
81. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 72, at 1452 (“[S]cholars generally agree that some
version of the two-part test predominates throughout the lower courts.”).
82. See supra Part III.B.
83. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); see also United States v.
Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010)).
84. Chester, 628 F.3d at 680. See also Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 668–69 (1st Cir. 2018),
cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 108 (2020) (reiterating the message in Chester).
85. Gould, 907 F.3d at 669.
86. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives,
700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012).
87. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011). Some courts also proceed by
assuming the first prong has been met and thus only address step two. See, e.g., Worman v. Healey,
922 F.3d 26, 36 (1st Cir. 2019) (“[W]e simply assume, albeit without deciding, that the [law]
burdens conduct that falls somewhere within the compass of the Second Amendment.”); Mai v.
United States, 974 F.3d 1082, 1098−99 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting how the district court assumed the
statute burdened the defendant’s Second Amendment rights, without deciding the question).
88. See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703. (“Borrowing from the Court’s First Amendment doctrine, the
rigor of this judicial review will depend on how close the law comes to the core of the Second
Amendment right and the severity of the law’s burden on the right.”).
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the Second Amendment right, courts utilize “a correspondingly strict
level of scrutiny,” whereas they use “a less demanding level of scrutiny”
for laws regulating conduct at the “periphery” of the right.89 As the D.C.
Circuit has elaborated, at the core of the Second Amendment is “the []
right of self-defense.”90 The First Circuit has more precisely defined the
core of the Second Amendment as “the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home,”
meaning public carry for self-defense falls to the periphery.91
To pass “constitutional muster” under intermediate scrutiny, there
must be a substantial relationship between the law at issue and “one or
more important governmental interests.”92 The government need not
prove there was no burden whatsoever on the Second Amendment; the
fit need not be perfect.93 But there is a higher bar to satisfy strict
scrutiny: The regulation at issue must be “narrowly tailored to advance
a compelling government interest.”94
Application of intermediate scrutiny has predominated in postHeller decisions nationwide, as lower courts have found many
regulations do not strike at the Second Amendment’s core.95 For
example, the Fifth Circuit found that a law preventing gun sales to
individuals under twenty-one did not strike at the core because the law
“[did] not prevent [eighteen]-to-[twenty]-year-olds from possessing
and using handguns in defense of hearth and home.”96 The D.C. Circuit
believes that intermediate scrutiny is the more appropriate standard
for gun registration laws writ large.97 And the Tenth Circuit has
explained that intermediate scrutiny is preferable for Second
Amendment cases because the right to carry firearms for self-defense
“poses inherent risk to others,” distinguishing this right from other

89. Gould, 907 F.3d at 671. See, e.g., id. at 670−71 (“The appropriate level of scrutiny must
turn on how closely a particular law or policy approaches the core of the Second Amendment
right and how heavily it burdens that right.”); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470
(4th Cir. 2011) (noting how “moving outside the home, firearm rights have always been more
limited, because public safety interests often outweigh individual interests in self-defense.”).
90. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
91. Gould, 907 F.3d at 672 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 673. See also Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 878 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding the
government’s important interest should be “substantially served” by enforcing the law at issue).
93. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 878.
94. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 469 (4th Cir. 2010).
95. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 72, at 1496.
96. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives,
700 F.3d 185, 206 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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fundamental rights analyzed under strict scrutiny.98
3. “Text, History, and Tradition” Approach
In lieu of utilizing the standard tiers of scrutiny at step-two, other
judges and legal scholars have proposed a different analytical
approach. This alternative “text, history, and tradition” approach
(“THT”) falls in line with the originalist and textualist approaches to
constitutional law, grounding interpretation in history and text.99 Under
this approach, traditional firearms bans and regulations would be
deemed “consistent with the Second Amendment individual right.”100
Conversely, bans and regulations “[in]sufficiently rooted” in THT
would not be consistent.101
Justice Kavanaugh, a newer addition to the Supreme Court, is a key
proponent of the THT framework. As a D.C. Circuit judge, he argued
that gun regulations ought to be “analyzed based on the Second
Amendment’s text, history, and tradition.”102 Though Heller and
McDonald were silent on THT as an interpretative method, Justice
Kavanaugh made the leap to argue these cases “leave little doubt” that
courts ought to use the THT method.103 For support, Justice Kavanaugh
pointed to the back and forth between the Heller majority and Justice
Breyer’s dissent, and how the majority concluded “the scope of the
right was determined by historical justifications.”104 An amicus brief,
however, from Second Amendment legal scholars submitted in Bruen
critiques THT.105 Namely, the authors believe that THT can easily
devolve into an “analogue test,” which could be “difficult for courts to
apply, unpredictable to government actors and opaque to the
people.”106 The authors contrast this with a “sounder and more
98. Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 2015).
99. See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 702 (6th Cir. 2016) (Batchelder,
J. concurring) (finding the two-step approach “fails to give adequate attention to the Second
Amendment’s original public meaning.”).
100. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.
dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1271.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1276−77 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 544 F.3d 570, 634−35) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
105. See Brief for Second Amendment Law Professors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither
Party at 8, N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (filed Jul. 20, 2021) [hereinafter
Law Professors’ Brief] (arguing that “[b]ereft of any administrable way to decide cases based on
history and tradition where they provide no clear precedent or analogs, courts will tend to stray
into covert, ad hoc interest balancing.”).
106. Id.
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transparent framework” using “means-end scrutiny.”107
C. Proper Cause Regimes in the Post-Heller World
This section more closely examines how the doctrine laid out in
Sections A and B has been applied by lower courts to public carry laws.
The Supreme Court has never definitively taken a stance on any public
carry law and has yet to address “whether the Second Amendment
creates a right of self-defense outside the home.”108 As a result, lower
courts are divided on whether the right to public carry exists and, if so,
how broad the right to public carry is, and whether it implicates the core
of Second Amendment protections. Applying Heller and relying largely
upon the two-step inquiry, the circuits have split on how proper cause
laws fare constitutionally.
1. Majority View: Proper Cause Laws Upheld
The First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have upheld
laws similar to New York’s proper cause regime for public carry.109 Both
the Ninth and Third Circuits upheld proper cause requirements for
public carry as constitutional at step one of the two-step inquiry. The
Ninth Circuit focused on the consistent historical laws prohibiting
concealed weapons “since at least 1541” in concluding that the Second
Amendment does not include the right to publicly carry concealed
firearms.110 Similarly, the Third Circuit found that a proper cause law
“qualifies as a longstanding, presumptively lawful regulation that
regulates conduct falling outside the scope of the Second
Amendment’s guarantee.”111
Alternatively, the First, Second, and Fourth Circuits approved of
similar proper cause requirements by applying both steps of the twostep inquiry. These courts began by assuming the laws met step one of
the inquiry because they burdened the Second Amendment, and then

107. Id.
108. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012).
109. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding
New York’s “proper cause” requirement when previously challenged); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d
426, 440 (3d Cir. 2013) (upholding New Jersey’s “justifiable need” requirement); Woollard v.
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882 (4th Cir. 2013) (upholding Maryland’s “good and substantial reason”
requirement); Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 669 (1st Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 108
(2020). (upholding Massachusetts’ “proper purpose” pre-requisite); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego,
824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding no Second Amendment right to carry concealed
weapons), cert denied, 137 S.Ct. 1995.
110. Peruta, 824 F.3d at 939.
111. Drake, 724 F.3d at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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proceeded to analyze the laws under intermediate scrutiny in step
two.112 For example, the First Circuit noted that the “challenged regime
bears a substantial relationship to important governmental interests in
promoting public safety and crime prevention” which did not “offend[]
Second Amendment rights.”113 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit found a
proper cause law “reasonably adapted to a substantial governmental
interest,”114 noting that the government’s concern with violent crimes
involving the use of handguns was “substantial.”115
2. Minority View: Proper Cause Laws Struck Down
Of the circuit courts that have ruled on the issue of public carry
regulations, only the D.C. and Seventh Ciarcuits have actually struck
down such laws. The D.C. Circuit rejected a law that “prohibit[ed] lawabiding citizens from carrying a handgun outside the home unless they
showed a special need for self-defense” and affirmed the “right of
responsible citizens to carry firearms for personal self-defense beyond
the home.”116 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit recognized that “the
interest in self-protection is as great outside as inside the home.”117
IV. ARGUMENTS
Petitioners advocate for the Court to adopt THT and rule that New
York’s law violates the Second Amendment. Petitioners claim that the
circuit courts which upheld similar proper cause laws did so by
misconstruing the Second Amendment. Respondents contend that any
disagreements between circuits are illusory, that all the courts agree the
Second Amendment is not unlimited, and that reasonable regulations
are allowed. Furthermore, Respondents contend history supports
regional variation in firearm regulations.

112. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 880 (Finding that while “the Heller right exists outside the
home” the law at issue was “a reasonable fit between the good-and-substantial-reason
requirement and Maryland’s objectives of protecting public safety and preventing crime.”);
Gould, 907 F.3d at 670, 673−77 (“In the absence of [Supreme Court] guidance, we decline to parse
this distinction . . . and proceed on the assumption that the [restrictions] burden the Second
Amendment right to carry a firearm for self-defense.”).
113. Gould, 907 F.3d at 662.
114. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876 (quoting United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th
Cir. 2010)).
115. Id.
116. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
117. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012).
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A. Petitioners’ Arguments
On the substantive question, Petitioners believe that lawful citizens
ought to be able to carry firearms for self-defense beyond their
homes.118 Under their readings of Heller and McDonald, the Second
Amendment guarantees “the individual right to keep arms” for selfdefense both inside and outside the home.119 Petitioners argue the
Second Amendment does not allow state officials to either restrict the
right of self-defense to a “chosen few” or to confine said right to the
home,120 implying that this is what has occurred in New York.
Petitioners believe the Court should resolve circuit differences by
finding that the Second Amendment protects a right to carry a handgun
outside the home.121 Petitioners assert that the New York law is
“materially indistinguishable” from the laws that were at issue in Wrenn
v. District of Columbia, Young v. Hawaii, and Peruta v. County of San
Diego.122 In each of those cases, the Petitioners point out, the respective
court found the Second Amendment right to apply outside the home
for self-defense purposes.123 By contrast, Petitioners highlight how the
other circuit courts wrongly upheld proper cause laws when they
“refused to recognize the Second Amendment’s applicability outside
the home or refused to give it any meaningful force.”124
Petitioners also take a “[t]ext, history, and tradition” approach to
argue New York’s law violates the Second Amendment.125 Regarding
text, Petitioners point to how the term “bear” appears to mean carrying
outside the home and thus to restrict the “bearing of arms” to homes
“would be nonsensical.”126 Petitioners also argue self-defense is the
core of the right to keep and bear arms127 and that the need for selfdefense arises outside the home.128 And they further point to the
Second Amendment’s mention of “the Militia” as evidence of the text’s
intent to encompass the right to bear arms outside the home.129
118. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 11.
119. Id. at 9.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 10.
123. Id. at 11.
124. Id. at 12.
125. Id. at 15.
126. Id. at 16−17.
127. Id. at 13 (concluding that “the core lawful purpose” of the right is self-defense both
inside and outside the home).
128. Id. 11.
129. Id. at 18 (“Militia service, of course, necessarily includes bearing arms outside the
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Turning to history, Petitioners argue the Second Amendment right
traditionally extended to public spaces.130 In colonial America, many
Founding Fathers carried publicly and spoke in favor of the right
thereof.131 Early state court cases upheld the right outside the home.132
Petitioners reject the Respondents’ historical account, particularly that
of the Statute of Northampton,133 which was a medieval English gun
regulation that has been influential in the United States gun debate.134
They note that while the statute prohibited most people from causing
“force in affray of peace,” the statute did not make the mere act of
carrying a firearm a crime.135
Refocusing on modern times, Petitioners cite Heller and its
reasoning in support of establishing a right to carry outside the home.
Though Heller was specifically about the need for self-defense in the
home, Petitioners contend its central issue was the general individual
right to self-defense.136 Indeed, they argue, portions of Heller would not
make sense if the Second Amendment right were restricted by
location.137
Consequently, Petitioners claim that circuits that upheld laws
restricting public carry misconstrued the foundation of the Second
Amendment; that these circuits mistakenly cited the core of the Second
Amendment as the right to defense of the home, when the core is
indeed self-defense everywhere.138 Whereas the circuits striking down
home.”).
130. Id. at 19.
131. Id. at 19.
132. See Id. at 20−22 (detailing the tradition of upholding the right to bear arms outside the
home across various state courts). See also Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (finding a statute
“valid inasmuch as it does not deprive the citizen of his natural right of self-defen[s]e, or of his
constitutional right to keep and bear arms . . . [a statute that] contains a prohibition against
bearing arms openly, is in conflict with the Constitution, and void.”) (emphasis in original); State
v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850) (noting that public carry “is [a] right guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States.”).
133. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 7, N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen (filed Mar.
10, 2021) (No. 20-843).
134. See Bernd Debusmann, Jr., How a Medieval English Law Affects the US Gun Control
Debate, BBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-59158248.
135. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 133, at 7.
136. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 24 (“The central issue in Heller persists
here: the individual and fundamental right of self-defense.”).
137. See Id. at 25 (“[S]everal portions of Heller make sense only upon the understanding that
the right to keep and bear arms is not home-bound . . . [t]hat caveat about places beyond the home
makes sense only if the Second Amendment applies beyond the home.”).
138. See id. at 13 (noting that each of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits focused
on “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”)
(citing Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 672 (1st Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 108 (2020)).
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restrictive public carry regimes stayed true to Heller and McDonald.139
Petitioners believe the New York law “is indistinguishable from the
[District of Columbia] regime” that was struck down in Wrenn v.
District of Columbia.140 The “constitutional defect[s]” of both are
identical because “law-abiding citizens” cannot obtain a handgun for
self-defense under either one.141
B. Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents’ principal argument centers on their claim that the
perceived circuit disagreements are “illusory.”142 They contend that the
lower courts that have ruled on similar laws have all acknowledged
“that the right to carry firearms in public is not unlimited and can be
subject to regulatory measures consistent with longstanding limitations
on that right.”143 Respondents further note that the First, Second, Third,
and Fourth Circuits approved of licensing schemes similar to the one in
Bruen in that they limited grants of licenses to individuals “who can
demonstrate good or proper cause.”144 In doing so, Respondents argue,
these circuit courts followed Heller’s guidance that the Second
Amendment “is not unlimited and that regulatory measures that are
part of a longstanding tradition are presumptively lawful.”145
Furthermore, Respondents highlight that these courts all “looked to
the centuries-long history” of public carry regulations “to conclude that
[proper] cause licensing schemes are consistent with the historical
scope of the Second Amendment.”146
Respondents question the Petitioners’ readings of the Seventh and
D.C. Circuits’ decisions on this matter as well. Respondents highlight
how the Seventh Circuit distinguished the law it struck down from New
York’s “measured licensing scheme [that] . . . [found] a proper balance”
between self-defense interests and public safety.147 Similarly,

139. Id. at 10–11 (referencing Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 667 (D.C. Cir.
2017); Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2018); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d
1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2014), cert denied, 137 S.Ct. 1995).
140. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 133, at 3–4.
141. Id. at 4.
142. Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 8, N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen (filed
Feb. 22, 2021) (No. 20-843).
143. Id..
144. Id. at 9.
145. Id. at 10 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 626−27, n.26
(2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 11–12 (quoting Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940 (7th Cir. 2012)).
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Respondents emphasize that the D.C. Circuit’s case “involved a
regulatory scheme that was far more restrictive than New York’s.”148
Respondents answer the Petitioners’ recantation of history with a
telling of their own. They note how public carry laws trace back to
colonial America, with conceptual origins in Fourteenth Century
England.149 Additionally, they note the history of regional variation of
such laws. Respondents argue this historical variation supports their
position because it shows that state and local authorities have
traditionally executed laws adapted to unique local circumstances.150
Lastly, Respondents underscore how the New York law advances
the state’s “compelling interests in public safety and crime
prevention.”151 They note empirical evidence and studies showing how
imposing controls of public carry can reduce gun-related homicides and
violence.152 According to Respondents, the legislature is best equipped
for policy judgments on complex empirical questions.153 And the New
York law at issue, Respondents note, “restricts no more conduct than is
necessary to advance its public safety objectives.”154
Overall, Petitioners utilize THT to conclude that New York’s
proper cause law violates the Second Amendment. Respondents, on the
other hand, focus on how consistent the circuit courts have been in
upholding proper cause laws, and that New York’s law is less stringent
than laws struck down by some circuits.
V. ORAL ARGUMENTS
Oral arguments for Bruen, held on November 3, 2021, seemed to
indicate that the Court will strike down the New York law. Yet, the
breadth of the Court’s ruling remains unclear. Some of the conservative
justices appeared ready to engage in a fundamental discussion of THT
(the “Conservative Group”).155 The liberal justices, however, wanted to
148. Id. at 13.
149. Id. at 20 (“Such laws include the Statute of Northampton in 1328, the English Bill of
Rights in 1689 and multiple colonial laws in America.”).
150. Id. at 24–25.
151. Id. at 26.
152. Id. at 28 (noting “lower rates of gun-related homicides and other violent crimes,
including shootings of law enforcement officers.”).
153. Id. at 30.
154. Id. at 30.
155. This Group included Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Alito. Justice Thomas asked about
an analysis based on “history, tradition, [and] the text of the Second Amendment.” Transcript of
Oral Argument at 6, 8, N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, (2021) (No. 20-843)
[hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]. Justice Kavanaugh recounted the “text, history, and
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narrow the Court’s focus to just the New York law (the “Liberal
Group”).156
History was a major theme for the Conservative Group. For
instance, Justice Thomas focused in on whether proper Second
Amendment analysis traces history to the founding or the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment.157 Justice Kavanaugh affirmed the need to
look to “historical practice,” though noting that “the baseline is always
the right established in the text.”158 Justice Alito challenged the notion
that later judicial decisions and statutes could “substitute for evidence
about what the right was understood to mean in 1791 or 1868. . . .”159
Justice Alito also highlighted the racialized history of the New York
law noting it was passed with “the belief that certain disfavored groups,
members of labor unions, [B]lacks, and Italians were carrying guns . . .
and they wanted them disarmed.”160 Inquiring about the Statute of
Northampton,161 Justice Gorsuch fell in line with this questioning as
well.162
By contrast, the Liberal Group questioned the utility of the historyheavy approach and challenged the Petitioners’ reading of history.
Justice Breyer pointed out that historical testimonies in the briefs were
in conflict.163 Justice Kagan underscored the uncertainties of historical
analysis, noting that if one were to “look to the history, [one] end[s] up
with a completely different set of rules” regarding concealed
weapons.164 Justice Sotomayor highlighted how history supports both
deference to the states on their gun regulations, as well as different
requirements for concealed arms outside the home.165
Building off the Petitioners’ oral argument, some justices from the
Conservative Group sought to contrast the Second Amendment with

tradition” approach in his questioning too. Id. at 52.
156. This Group included Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Breyer.
157. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 155, at 6, 8.
158. Id. at 52.
159. Id. at 106.
160. Id. at 103.
161. Under this statute, no man other than the King’s servants and ministers could “with
force and arms” come before the King or cause a “force in affray of the peace.” 2 Edw. 3, ch.3
(Eng. 1328). Both Petitioners and Respondents raised the Statute of Northampton in their
arguments. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 133, at 7; Respondents’ Brief, supra note 142,
at 20.
162. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 155, at 48.
163. Id. at 11.
164. Id. at 40–41.
165. Id. at 18–19.
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other constitutional rights.166 Seeming to assert that no other
constitutional right is being chipped away at like the Second
Amendment is, Justice Alito theorized whether the Court would be
receptive to like arguments about First Amendment interpretation.167
Some justices from the Liberal Group reacted to this line of
questioning: For instance, Justice Kagan asked Respondents’ counsel,
“what justification is there for allowing greater flexibility [with the
Second Amendment]?”168 Justice Sotomayor attempted to distinguish
the Second Amendment, asking, perhaps rhetorically, whether “we
have any other constitutional right whose exercise in history has been
as varied as gun possession and use?”169 Respondents’ counsel agreed
with Justice Sotomayor on this point.170
During Petitioners’ oral argument, justices from both Groups
wanted to focus on an alternative “sensitive places” gun regulation,171
despite the reticence of Petitioners’ counsel to litigate this point.172
Justice Kagan asked for the thoughts of Petitioners’ counsel on
allowing guns on the New York City Subway, or on the campuses of
Columbia University or New York University.173 Justice Barrett
similarly inquired about restrictions placed on a crowded Times Square
on New Year’s Eve.174
There was also cross-Group interest in the discretion provided to
officials by the New York law. Indeed, Justice Kavanaugh asked
whether the main problem was this discretion.175 Justice Sotomayor
asked why the proper cause discretion was “any different” than the
discretion local officials had to deny licenses to, for example, people
with mental illnesses.176 Petitioners’ counsel brought up the “real-world
costs” of this discretion in rebuttal: Citing an amicus brief submitted by

166. See id. at 96 (As Justice Roberts pointed out, “the idea that you need a license to exercise
[a] right . . . is unusual in the context of the Bill of Rights.”).
167. Id. at 104–05.
168. Id. at 75.
169. Id. at 76–77.
170. See id. at 77 (acknowledging there is a “strong history [] of a range of responses from
state-to-state that is based on local conditions and local concerns.”).
171. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 544 U.S. 626, n.26 (finding “laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings” to be
“presumptively lawful.”).
172. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 155, at 26 (distinguishing sensitive place
restrictions as “really [] a different animal than carry restriction[s].”).
173. Id. at 27–29.
174. Id. at 31.
175. Id. at 50.
176. Id. at 22.
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public defenders, he mentioned that this discretion has led to people
being charged with violent offenses, despite not having a prior record,
and impacted police activity, possibly increasing ‘stop and frisk.’177
VI. ANALYSIS
It seems very likely the Supreme Court will strike down the New
York law, but a key variable bearing on the outcome is what kind of
analysis the Court will use in doing so. Given its current composition,
this Court will likely utilize THT. Unfortunately, striking down the New
York law and adopting this new interpretive approach would be flawed,
and would potentially create a sea of negative change for proper cause
regimes, may issue jurisdictions, and gun laws overall.
A. Utilizing the Two-Part Inquiry Versus “Text, History, and
Tradition”
Although Heller explicitly named regulations like felon-inpossession laws as presumptively lawful prohibitions, it stopped short
of deciding the legal status of public carry prohibitions.178 The Court
thus cannot read Heller as dispositive in Bruen, and will have to
proceed with some other method of analysis. In this way, Bruen offers
the Court an opportunity to fill in doctrinal gaps that Heller left
behind.179 The Court could affirm the approach taken by most postHeller lower courts by adopting the two-part inquiry.180 Alternatively,
the Court could reject this system and adopt the notably less popular
THT.181
Assuming adoption of the two-part inquiry, the Court would first
need to determine whether the New York law burdens the Second
Amendment.182 Looking to historical evidence for guidance,183 there is
some indication that the right to public carry falls within the
Amendment’s scope. As written, the Second Amendment recognizes
the need for the right to bear arms in light of the need for a well-

177. Id. at 121–22.
178. District of Columbia v. Heller, 544 U.S. 570, 626–28 (2008).
179. Id.
180. See discussion supra Part III.B.
181. “Text, history, and tradition” is not a foregone conclusion, though, as the Respondents
underscored during their oral argument. See discussion supra Part III.B, Part V.
182. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining the first
question).
183. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting the question of
scope involves looking at how the right was understood at the “relevant historical moment.”).
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regulated militia, implying the need to carry arms beyond the home.184
Petitioners also highlight how the right to possess a firearm
traditionally extended beyond the home, a position that was endorsed
by both colonial-era leaders and early state courts.185 But Respondents’
understanding of history underscores that public carry restrictions
trace back to colonial times as well.186 Regardless of colonial
understandings, however, the law at issue is a state law, so the reference
point for the historical analysis should be 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified.187 Both colonial history as well as pre-1868
caselaw are thus of little analytical importance here. The post-1868
history presented does not show that public carry is categorically
protected. But because it also fails to show that public carry has been
categorically unprotected, the Court would need to proceed to step two
of the inquiry.188
For step two, the Court would have to determine the appropriate
level of scrutiny, looking at whether the right falls at the core or
periphery of Second Amendment protections.189 The New York law
burdens the right to carry outside the home for self-defense. Second
Amendment jurisprudence shows that at the “zenith” of the
Amendment is the right to keep a gun in the home for self-defense.190
Petitioners’ argument that self-defense is not location dependent is
incorrect191 The core of the Second Amendment is the right to keep a
gun at home, rendering the right to bear arms outside the home for selfdefense a peripheral one.192 Similar to the law upheld by the Sixth
Circuit that prevented firearm sales to those under twenty-one,193 New
York’s law does not strike the Second Amendment’s core because it
does not impede individuals from defending their homes. Thus,
intermediate scrutiny would be the proper standard to apply in Bruen.
To apply intermediate scrutiny, the Court would need to identify an
184. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
185. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 19.
186. Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 142, at 20.
187. See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 706 (examining the question of scope by looking to how “the
Second Amendment was understood when incorporated as a limitation on the States.”).
188. Id. at 703.
189. Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 670−71 (1st Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 108 (2020)..
190. Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012).
191. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 13.
192. See Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 672 (1st Cir. 2018) (noting the core of the Second
Amendment is the right to use arms in defense of one’s home).
193. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 206 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding the law because it did not prevent
individuals from defending their homes).
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important government interest and find a substantial fit between such
interest and the New York law.194 Other courts have consistently found
a legitimate government interest in preventing crime and violence,195
and it is doubtful that the Court would challenge this point. More
analysis would likely go into determining how reasonable of a fit the
New York law is. As Respondents point out, other lower courts have
remarked that the New York law, which does not operate as an outright
ban, is “measured” and “strik[es] a proper balance.”196 If properly
applying the two-step inquiry, it is likely that the Court would find a
substantial fit between the compelling interest of public safety and the
New York law.
Interestingly, while under the two-step inquiry public carry laws are
not categorically prohibited, they may not fare well under the
alternative THT approach. But the Court will likely toss the two-part
analysis to the wayside and proceed with the flawed THT framework
anyway.197 Petitioners map out how the Court could, and likely would,
proceed.198
Beginning with the Second Amendment itself and its reference to a
“[m]ilitia,” a “text, history, and tradition” analysis would likely lead to
the conclusion that self-defense, core to the Amendment, is largely
needed outside the home. The Court could lean more heavily on early
American history to confirm a “natural right to self-defen[s]e,”199 since
this analysis does not restrict judges to certain eras of history as the
two-part inquiry does. With the ability to be more expansive in how
much history it may consider, the Court can more easily strike down
the New York law. The justices could find that public carry has long
been a part of American culture and is at the core of the Second
Amendment. From there, they would find this right cannot be infringed
by a law that restricts who may exercise it.

194. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 707 (7th Cir. 2011).
195. See, e.g., Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 673 (1st Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 108
(2020) (“[F]ew interests are more central to a state government than protecting the safety and
well-being of its citizens.”); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (“[W]e can think
of no better example of the police power . . . than the suppression of violent crime.”).
196. Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 142, at 11–13 (noting how the D.C. Circuit
dealt with a more restrictive ban in Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).
197. See Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 105, at 7 (highlighting limitations on the “text,
history, and tradition” test, particularly where there is no clear precedent, and concluding that
“courts required to decide cases based solely on history and tradition would tend to either shroud
their policy preferences in selective historiography or resort to abstruse analogies.”).
198. See discussion supra notes 137–48 and accompanying text.
199. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846).
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B. Understanding the Composition of the Roberts Court
Of the current Supreme Court justices, four were present for Heller.
Three (Justices Roberts, Alito, and Thomas) joined Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion while one (Justice Breyer) dissented. Justice Breyer’s
Heller dissent showcased a consequentialist approach by focusing
heavily on the policy implications and real-world impact of the Court’s
decision.200 This dissent indicates he may pay similar attention to policy
implications in Bruen. Five current justices were present for the
subsequent McDonald decision, with the same majority group as
Heller. In McDonald, Justice Alito wrote the controlling opinion, taking
issue with what he saw as the government’s disregard for the Second
Amendment.201 Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence,202 while Justice
Breyer wrote another dissent which Justice Sotomayor joined.203
In his McDonald concurrence, Justice Thomas made his opinion on
the Second Amendment clear, and he has wanted the Court to take up
another case ever since.204 Justice Thomas focused on the racialized
history of gun regulations as support for extending bolstered gun
rights.205 It would not be surprising if Justice Thomas wrote an opinion
in Bruen in which he cites the brief from the public defenders for the
contention that the New York law has a racially disparate impact.206
The newest members of the Supreme Court have made their views
known both through their prior decisions and their confirmation
processes. As a judge on the D.C. Circuit, Justice Kavanaugh called for
courts to adopt THT for Second Amendment cases.207 Justice Barrett,
200. See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 544 U.S. 570, 659, 681–723 (2008) (Breyer,
J. dissenting).
201. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (“Respondents, in effect, ask
us to treat the right recognized in Heller as a second-class right, subject to an entirely different
body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees that we have held to be incorporated into
the Due Process Clause.”).
202. Id. at 742.
203. Id.
204. See Peruta v. California, cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1995, 1999 (2017) (Thomas, J. dissenting)
(“The Court’s decision to deny certiorari in this case reflects a distressing trend: the treatment of
the Second Amendment as a disfavored right.”).
205. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 843–45, 857 (Thomas, J. concurring in part and judgment)
(noting that pre-Civil War state legislatures prohibited slaves and freedmen alike from carrying
firearms and how, post-War, “[t]he use of firearms for self-defense was often the only way black
citizens could protect themselves from mob violence.”).
206. Brief of the Black Attorneys of Legal Aid, The Bronx Defenders, Brooklyn Defender
Services, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5–6, N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc.
v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (filed Jul. 20, 2021) [hereinafter Public Defenders’ Brief].
207. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.
dissenting).
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as a Seventh Circuit judge, showed disdain for broad-based regulations
when she wrote in dissent in Kanter v. Barr that the “dispossession of
all felons,” rather than just violent ones, of the right to own a gun is
unconstitutional.208 She argued that felon dispossession went to the
“core” of the Second Amendment and thus required heightened
scrutiny,209 despite the Supreme Court recognizing felon dispossession
as a longstanding and presumptively lawful prohibition.210 Indeed,
Justice Barrett said during her Supreme Court confirmation process
that Kanter was the most significant case over which she sat.211 She
further noted that her dissent in the case reflects her judicial
philosophy and is an example of how she understands the Second
Amendment’s “original meaning.”212
A majority of the Court thus appears ready to rule in favor of the
Petitioners. The only question that remains unclear is how narrow or
broad that ruling will be, and the Court could do away with the twopart inquiry used by lower courts altogether. There readily appears a
group of justices that would dissent in a ruling favoring the Petitioners,
arguing that the law be upheld. Furthermore, it seems these dissenting
justices would oppose an adoption of THT; it is not entirely clear,
though, whether they would endorse the two-part inquiry.
C. Policy Implications
Policy implications will provide little sway for the majority of the
Court, but will likely be a motivator for Justice Breyer, given his
previous, decidedly consequentialist, dissents.213 A variety of amici in
support of Respondents have raised concerns over the possible result
of increased targeted harm based on race or gender.214 By contrast, the

208.
209.
210.
211.

Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J. dissenting).
Id. at 465 (Barrett, J. dissenting).
District of Columbia v. Heller, 544 U.S. 570, 628, n. 26 (2008).
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NOMINEE
TO THE SUPREME COURT 30 (Comm. Print 2021).
212. C-SPAN, Barrett Confirmation Hearing, Day 2 Part 1 (Oct. 13, 2021), https://www.cspan.org/video/?476316-1/barrett-confirmation-hearing-day-2-part1&event=476316&playEvent.
213. See generally Heller, 544 U.S. at 681–723 (2008) (Breyer, J. dissenting) (focusing the
thrust of this dissent on the policy implications that would stem from the majority opinion).
214. Brief of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (filed Sept. 21,
2021); Brief of NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (filed Sept. 21, 2021); Brief
of National Coalition Against Domestic Violence as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (filed Sept. 21, 2021).
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public defenders underscore the adverse and racialized impact of the
New York law as it currently stands, and that it disproportionately
criminalizes people of color.215 Other briefs for the Petitioners echo this
sentiment and argue that gun regulations like New York’s have
disparate impacts on communities of color.216
New York’s “proper cause” licensing regime is not the only
regulation at risk in this case. Depending on how the Supreme Court
rules, its decision could impact the other “proper cause” regimes,217 and
as Petitioners’ Counsel recognized during his clients’ oral argument,
licensing regimes more broadly.218 It is plausible that a broad ruling
could “constitutionally mandate[] a ‘shall issue’ regime for public
carrying licenses,”219 that would affect over a quarter of the country’s
population.220 Furthermore, if the Court uses this opportunity to adopt
THT, the result could be an overhaul of lower court precedent.
Licensing requirements for public carry are crucial to gun regulations
in the United States.221 As courts have noted, states with more stringent
public carry restrictions can reduce gun-related homicide and crime.222
Striking down the New York law could therefore have an adverse effect
on public safety in vast swaths of the country.
D. The New York Law Should be Upheld
It would be incorrect for the Court to strike down the New York
law as unconstitutional. The right decision, on the other hand, could be
made using either the two-step inquiry or a “text, history, and tradition”
analysis. Under the former, the Court could find concealed carry
215. See Public Defenders’ Brief, supra note 206, at 12−14 (noting how the city “aggressively
sends its police. . . [to] take firearms away from minority men and deter them from carrying” and
underscoring the racial disparities in the “penal consequences” that result).
216. Darrell A.H. Miller, Conservatives Sound Like Anti-racists – When the Cause is Gun
Rights, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/10/27/gunrights-anti-racism-bruen-conservative-hypocrisy/.
217. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
218. See Joseph Blocher, Good Cause Requirements for Carrying Guns in Public, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 218, 219 (2014) (“[T]heir challenges could effectively compel states to issue public
carrying licenses to anyone who is . . . excluded from the scope of Second Amendment
coverage.”).
219. Id.
220. See Concealed Carry Laws, supra note 23. Calculated from the total population of
current “may issue” states. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. See also U.S. Census
Bureau, Annual Estimates of Resident Population for the Nation and States,
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/technical-documentation/research/evaluationestimates/2020-evaluation-estimates/2010s-state-total.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2022).
221. Blocher, supra note 218, at 219. See also Concealed Carry Laws, supra note 23.
222. Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 675 (1st Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 108 (2020).
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outside the scope of the Second Amendment, as the Third and Ninth
Circuits did.223 Alternatively, the Court could either determine that the
right to concealed carry falls within the scope, or could just assume it
does like the First, Second, and Fourth Circuits did.224 If the Court
proceeds to the second step, intermediate scrutiny would be
appropriate. The core of the Second Amendment right, as declared in
Heller, is the right to self-defense in the home.225 Thus, carrying outside
the home falls to the periphery of the right. Under intermediate
scrutiny,226 the Court could find a substantial fit between the
government’s objective here and the means chosen. Here, a law
restricting guns outside the home to those most in need of such
instruments is a reasonable fit to New York’s objectives to protect
public safety and minimize risk of crime. Unlike other states’ total bans,
the New York law allows for a subset of the population to access a
weapon outside the home if they can demonstrate a serious need. This
regime thus does not infringe on the Amendment’s core right to selfdefense in the home.
Applying the THT framework, the law should also still remain.
There have long been restrictions on concealed carry.227 Indeed, New
York has a long history of concealed carry restrictions that laid the
foundations for the current law.228 Nevertheless, choosing THT would
be wrong because the approach itself is flawed. History cannot be
clearly discerned; there has long been regional variation in gun laws,
public carry in particular. Furthermore, THT relies on analogical
reasoning which, in light of technological advances in firearms that the
founders could not have predicted, is reaching its logical limit in the
gun context.229 Lastly, adopting this approach has the potential to
massively disrupt Second Amendment doctrine. The majority of the
circuit courts have already adopted the two-step inquiry,230 an inquiry

223. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
224. See supra Part III.C.1.
225. See discussion supra Part III.A.
226. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
227. See Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 929−33 (9th Cir. 2016) (recounting the
history of public carry laws in the United States), cert denied, 137 S.Ct. 1995.
228. See Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westcheter, 701 F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The proper cause
requirement has existed in New York since 1913. . .”); see also id. at 97 (noting how New York
enacted the Sullivan Law in 1911 in recognition of “the dangers inherent in the carrying of
handguns in public.”).
229. See generally Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 105 (advocating for the two-part inquiry
given the shortcomings of the other analytical framework).
230. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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in line with other constitutional legal doctrine.231 Adopting THT could
threaten not only proper cause regimes, but other laws providing for
registration requirements, thus leading to the proliferation of guns. The
Court should not readily endorse a mode of analysis that has a rocky
foundation and that could lead to calamitous outcomes.
CONCLUSION
After over a decade of letting lower courts interpret Heller and
develop their own Second Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court is stepping back into the fray. In deciding Bruen, the Court will
at the very least decide whether “proper cause” regimes like the New
York law can be constitutional. The Court should uphold the New York
law, because it is grounded in history, tailored to a substantial and
compelling government interest in public safety, and avoids adverse
policy implications.
Alternatively, should the Court find the law unconstitutional, as it
is likely to do, it should not go as far as to threaten all “may issue”
jurisdictions. If the Court will choose to dictate how lower courts should
be analyzing Second Amendment challenges, it will likely adopt the
“text, history, and tradition” approach which could throw lower court
precedent into question. The Court should refrain from so altering the
jurisprudence. The two-part inquiry is in line with other constitutional
rights analyses. To discard it would put Second Amendment doctrine
out of step with that of other constitutional rights and send shockwaves
through both lower courts and state legislatures. While it seems
predictable that the Court in Bruen will strike down the New York law
and may adopt the THT framework, it would be a mistake to do so.

231. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[A]s has been the
experience under the First Amendment, we might expect that courts will employ different types
of scrutiny in assessing burdens on Second Amendment rights, depending on the character of the
Second Amendment question presented.”).

